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An important part of what it means for agents to be situated in the everyday world
of human affairs includes their engagement with economic practices. In this paper,
we employ the concept of cognitive institutions in order to provide an enactive and
interactive interpretation of market and economic reasoning. We challenge traditional
views that understand markets in terms of market structures or as processors of
distributed information. The alternative conception builds upon the notion of the market
as a “scaffolding institution.” Introducing the concept of market as a “socially extended”
cognitive institution we go beyond the notion of scaffolding to provide an enactive
view of economic reasoning that understands the market participant in terms of social
interactive processes and relational autonomy. Markets are more than inert devices
for information processing; they can be viewed as “highly scaffolded,” where strong
constraints and incentives predictably direct agents’ behavior. Building on this idea
we argue that markets emerge from (a) the economic interaction of both supply and
demand sides, in continual and mutual interplay, and (b) more basic social interactions.
Consumer behavior in the marketplace is complex, not only contributing to determine
the market price, but also extending the consumer’s cognitive processes to reliably
attain a correct evaluation of the good. Moreover, this economic reasoning is socially
situated and not something done in isolation from other consumers. From a socially
situated, interactive point of view buying or not buying a good is something that enacts
the market. This shifts the status of markets from external institutions that merely
causally affect participants’ cognitive processes to social institutions that constitutively
extend these cognitive processes. On this view the constraints imposed by social
interactions, as well as the possibilities enabled by such interactions, are such that
economic reasoning is never just an individual process carried out by an autonomous
individual, classically understood. In this regard, understanding the concept of relational
autonomy allows us to see how economic reasoning is always embodied, embedded
in, and scaffolded by intersubjective interactions, and how such interactions make the
market what it is.
Keywords: market structure, economic reasoning, socially extended mind, autonomy, functional integration, task
dependency
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INTRODUCTION
Theories of situated cognition typically ignore an important
set of situated practices that are pervasive in our everyday
lives – our participation in markets and economic activities. Such
activities involve the exercise of a common form of reasoning
embedded in significant social interactions and/or socially and
normatively defined contexts. The lack of attention to these
practices, however, is for the most part one-sided. Although
there is a diverse set of economists who discuss situated and
institutional approaches to economic reasoning (e.g., North,
1990; Kirman, 1999; Smith, 2007; Hodgson, 2009), philosophers,
psychologists and cognitive scientists who venture into the
study of situated cognition or social cognitive processes rarely
discuss economic reasoning or economic behavior. Moreover,
when philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists more
generally discuss economic reasoning or economic behavior
it is, with few exceptions, without regard for situational or
intersubjective factors. In particular, they typically frame them
in terms of traditional notions of rational choice and abstract
decision-making or, more recently, in terms of behavioral and
cognitive biases. In addition we note that, even those who count
as exceptions emphasize the idea that economic institutions,
such as markets, operate primarily as external constraints on
individual cognitive processes. Thereby they adopt a relatively
conservative and narrow conception of situated cognition.
In contrast, we propose an enactivist interpretation of the
notion of market that emphasizes the role of social interactions.
On this view, markets are socially extended cognitive institutions
(Gallagher, 2013). This means that market forces, rather
than external constraints or inert substructures, constitute
an economic order enacted in the dynamical interplay of
embodied, situated, and materially engaged agents who maintain
relational autonomy in a world that is both physical and social.
Understanding the nature of such markets, we argue, throws light
on an important dimension of everyday situated behavior.
In working out this enactive conception of market we
challenge some traditional views that understand markets in
terms of market structures or as processors of distributed
information. To develop an alternative conception we take as
a starting point the notion of the market as a ‘scaffolding
institution’ understood in terms of the extended mind (Clark,
1997a,b, Chapter 9; Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Markets can be
understood through the lens of scaffolded choice in which, rather
than internal mental states – such as “beliefs, desires, or other
psychological features of individuals involved” – what counts for
economic reasoning are the engagements with external structures
that constrain and enable agents’ behaviors and interactions
(Clark, 1997a, p. 272; see also Denzau and North, 1994). In this
paper we push this idea in a more enactive direction and toward
a socially interactive interpretation of economic reasoning,
by employing the concept of mental or cognitive institution
understood in terms of the “socially extended mind” (Gallagher
and Crisafi, 2009; Gallagher, 2013; Slaby and Gallagher, 2015).
We begin by reviewing some basic concepts of the market and
economic reasoning, especially as understood in the neoclassical
tradition and its recent developments. We do this both for
purposes of later contrast, and because these neoclassical
concepts influenced Andy Clark’s ideas about markets as
“extended institutions,” which he proposed some 20 years ago
(Clark, 1997a,b) when neoclassical models were still relatively
unchallenged by behavioral economics. We then discuss Clark’s
model of the market as scaffolding and constraining economic
reasoning, and some deficiencies that we find in it. We next
introduce the model of the socially extended mind and the
concept of cognitive institution as a way to understand how
markets are enacted in social interactions. This perspective
allows us to see that economic reasoning is a more socially
interactive process than an individual deliberation, and that
in specific conditions it can veer toward purely instrumental
calculation, or under different conditions promote autonomy in
its relational form.
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF MARKETS:
STRUCTURE, INFORMATION
PROCESSING AND MENTAL MODELS
Theoretical speculations about markets as exchange and
allocation mechanisms go back at least to the classic idea of
the ‘invisible hand’ proposed by Adam Smith (Smith, 1776).
According to this view, markets are seen as mechanisms allowing
parties to exchange goods and services, thus increasing individual
and social welfare. However, more recently, economists have
looked at markets more generally as coordination mechanisms:
whenever transaction costs – i.e., the costs of using the price
mechanism – are low, markets are considered to solve a number
of coordination problems better than alternative coordination
mechanisms (see Williamson, 1981a). A “paradox” (Hodgson,
2008) in the research on markets is that economists have been
nearly obsessed with market prices and market efficiency but
relatively inattentive to markets as “places” in which people
interact, build relationships, learn, and take care of an increasing
part of their life interests. This suggests that much is still to
be understood about markets. The ubiquity of the textbook
definition stating that a market is a “mechanism through
which buyers and sellers interact to determine prices and
exchange goods, services, and assets” (Samuelson and Nordhaus,
2010, p. 26) just reinforces the sense of taken-for-grantedness
surrounding this notion.
Although Samuelson and Nordhaus’s definition aptly focuses
on the fundamental requirement that buyers and sellers interact
in the market, economics has mostly refrained from studying
the process of interaction itself, focusing more on the structure
of markets and how information is processed either by market
structure or by individual traders. Market structure is defined
by a few key features (also called “basic conditions,” Scherer,
1980): the number, size, and distribution of buyers and
sellers, market share, possibility of free entry, and product
differentiation. Any particular combination of these variables is
said to determine the behavior and economic decisions of market
participants, and eventually market price. Ideal-typical market
structures are perfect competition, monopolistic competition,
oligopoly, duopoly, monopoly, monopsony, and oligopsony.
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More concretely, the notion of ‘market micro-structure’ aims
to study the specificities of different negotiation, trading, and
exchange mechanisms (O’Hara, 1995).
The work of Friedrich A. Hayek has given a fundamental
epistemological twist to the study of markets by focusing
on the role of market information (this has been called the
“information revolution” in economics; see Mirowski and Nik-
Khah, 2017). According to Hayek, information is so fragmentary
and dispersed across a large number of individuals in society
that it cannot be effectively collected and processed by any
centralized agency (Hayek, 1948). It is the market interaction
and economic reasoning of individuals guided by their own
beliefs and preferences that render market prices “signals” of
the underlying beliefs and preferences. In other words, the
market mechanism would process dispersed information and
convey it in the form of market prices. In this view, markets are
conceptualized as information processors (Hayek, 1945). From the
work of Hayek onward, information has acquired a central status
among the basic conditions of market structure.
Various benchmarks can be used to assess markets.
Traditionally, the four main market benchmarks are static and
dynamic efficiency, equity (a particularly relevant benchmark
in fields like law and economics), and macroeconomic stability
(Scherer, 1980). Efficiency can be further specified depending
on the scale (at the firm or at the industry level) and on the
focus (technical, economic, productive, and allocative efficiency)
(see Tremblay and Tremblay, 2012). Informational efficiency
is the market’s property of reflecting in the prices all available
information: to put it normatively, a market is informationally
efficient to the extent that the market price is able to reflect
all available information (Fama, 1965). In this framework,
“asymmetry of information” between buyers and sellers is
considered one of the main causes of market failure, i.e., when
the price system does not reliably work as signal mechanism
(Akerlof, 1970). Furthermore, searching for information in
markets is costly (Stigler, 1961), so that the search process
may considerably affect the convenience of using the market
mechanism. The cost of information is one of the determinants
of so-called “transaction costs,” i.e., those costs associated with
the use of the market mechanism (Williamson, 1981a). The
fact that transaction costs affect the convenience of the market
mechanism leads buyers (individuals or firms) to look for other,
possibly more convenient, coordination mechanisms. One main
alternative to markets is the “make” option, i.e., buyers/firms
decide to make a product or service on their own instead of
buying it on the market (Coase, 1937).
Hierarchies may be preferable to the market mechanism
when transaction costs are high. The existence of hierarchies –
such as large-scale business enterprises – can be explained
by structural features of complex and advanced economies in
which transaction costs play a fundamental role (Williamson,
1981b). Chandler’s (1977) provocative notion of the ‘visible hand’
emphasizes the role of managerial activity for coordinating the
allocation of economic resources as an alternative to market
mechanism. Such a view deliberately contrasts with the classical
view of market as an efficient and self-organizing device. But
hierarchies are not the sole alternative to the market form
of coordination. For instance, ‘clans’ are alternative forms to
hierarchies and markets as they characterize situations in which
obligations among transacting agents are not coordinated by
an authority (as it happens in hierarchies) and cannot be
extinguished ‘just in time’ (as it is possible in some forms of
market) (see Ouchi, 1980; Adler, 2001).
Buyers and sellers, whether single individuals or firms,
are said to act according to their beliefs, preferences and,
most importantly, convenience. This is a basic assumption
of neo-classical economics. In the last decades, the new
field of ‘behavioral economics’ has tried to introduce more
realistic assumptions on how agents behave in economic
contexts (such as markets), by investigating the behavioral
and cognitive determinants of economic actions. Nowadays,
behavioral economics has become a standard framework in
economics, by abandoning the aprioristic form of theorizing
typical of neoclassical economics, and embracing experimental
methods borrowed from the behavioral and cognitive sciences
(Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000; Camerer and Loewenstein,
2004). The new partnership between economics and behavioral
and cognitive psychology has rendered a more realistic image of
market participants as ridden by behavioral and cognitive biases,
which prevent them from reliably and consistently processing
(even their own) information. For instance, the “endowment
effect,” which is the difference between the price a seller
assigns to her own product and the price that seller would
be willing to pay, had she to buy that product on the market
(Kahneman et al., 1991), arguably affects the reliability of the
market mechanism (Kahneman et al., 1990). By taking this
behavioral route, economic models of markets now typically
include agents that are both rational (i.e., utility maximizers;
see Blume and Easley, 2008) and irrational (i.e., non-utility
maximizers) (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985; Russell and Thaler, 1985),
or agents who are “psychologically enhanced,” i.e., provided
with behavioral features (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2016). Some
‘pragmatic’ interpreters of behavioral economics (e.g., Chetty,
2015) maintain that the true aim of behavioral economics should
be that of discerning the contexts in which the assumptions of
neoclassical economics work from those in which they should
be replaced. Behavioral finance is a field that makes large use
of cognitive and behavioral insights to study financial decisions
beyond the neoclassical view (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). As
far as markets are concerned, behavioral finance suggests that
behavioral and cognitive biases would ultimately explain why
prices in financial markets follow “irrational” patterns (Shiller,
2015). This does not mean, however, that behavioral economics
as such supports an anti-market position (Sugden, 2018).
By taking a different route with respect to behavioral
economics, also in the kind of experimental methods employed
(Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001), the field of so-called ‘experimental
economics’ studies how monetary incentives and rule-based
coordination mechanisms are able to cancel out individuals’
cognitive biases either in single transactions or in the aggregate
(Smith, 2007). The development of new game-theoretic
tools has allowed economists to study how various market
arrangements differ in terms of information efficiency, not
just with the aim of assessing extant markets’ efficiency but
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also with the aim of designing from scratch new markets
with customized informational properties. The possibility of
designing entirely new markets stems from the development
of information technologies (ITs) allowing the construction of
virtual marketplaces and from the development of new branches
of economics able to provide a more complex and sophisticated
picture of market phenomena (Shapiro and Varian, 1998). The
development of new fields in economics such as “mechanism
design” (e.g., Hurwicz and Reiter, 2006), and more specifically
“market design” (Vulkan et al., 2013), testifies to the fundamental
need to address new forms of market, a need invariably satisfied
by focusing and intervening on markets’ informational properties
(Mirowski and Nik-Khah, 2017). Typically, market designers aim
to off-load much of the market participants’ cognitive burden
onto the rules of the market: market rules as strict, unambiguous,
and as easy-to-follow as possible would lead to more effectively
attain the desired level of efficiency. Analytical results that
demonstrate that market efficiency can be attainable also by
“zero-intelligence” traders (Gode and Shyam, 1993) support this
market design’s constructivist view.
The rise of market design approaches also stems from
economists’ awareness that markets are better conceptualized
as “institutions” that order interpersonal relations.1 This view
is best represented by the work of Douglass North (e.g.,
North, 1990). Institutions, according to North, would stem from
individuals’ “shared mental models” (Denzau and North, 1994),
and institutional change would take place only when these mental
models change (North, 2005).2 The lack of perfect knowledge or
information, i.e., uncertainty, would be at the root of this process
of mental model sharing:
Under conditions of uncertainty, individuals’ interpretation
of their environment will reflect their learning. Individuals
with common cultural backgrounds and experiences will
share reasonably convergent mental models, ideologies, and
institutions; and individuals with different learning experiences
(both cultural and environmental) will have different theories
(models, ideologies) to interpret their environment (Denzau and
North, 1994, pp. 3–4).
North’s emphasis on mental models testifies to the fact that
this strand of research on “markets as institutions” is part of
the information-processing paradigm within economics, as these
mental models are mainly constituted by beliefs, preferences,
expectations that populate people’s mental representations of the
institutions they act in.
We can agree with Denzau and North that something
is “shared” in markets conceived as institutions. We pursue
this suggestion in the following sections: what is shared are
the cultural practices, the external cognitive artifacts and
technologies that contribute to making the market an institution,
1On the basis of North (1990), Denzau and North (1994, p. 4) define institutions as
“the rules of the game of a society [consisting] of formal and informal constraints
constructed to order interpersonal relationships.”
2“The mental models are the internal representations that individual cognitive
systems create to interpret the environment; the institutions are the external (to
the mind) mechanisms individuals create to structure and order the environment”
(Denzau and North, 1994, p. 4).
rather than internal mental variables. The notion of zero-
intelligence traders is an abstraction; but there is something real
that can be specified about market intelligence. One attempt to
build on this kind of externalism can be found in the notion of
the extended mind.
MARKET AS EXTENDED MIND
Social and economic environments are more than passive
products of human agency; they actively contribute to the
reproduction of the stable organizations and practices that
enable and constrain human behaviors (see Giddens, 1984).
Accordingly, markets are more than inert structures for
information processing devoted to solving allocation and
coordination problems involving collectivity. Borrowing
significantly from Denzau and North, Clark (1997a) conceives
of markets as structures that provide epistemic scaffolding,
involving strong constraints and incentives that predictably
direct agents’ behavior. Such structures are able to produce a
“cognitive economy” as they steer individuals’ decisions and
actions: they reduce in a significant manner the cognitive
effort for information processing by externalizing a number
of processes. The idea that economic decision-making takes
place in such highly scaffolded environments would explain
why neoclassical economics works, “(insofar as it works at all)”
(Clark, 1997b, p. 271).
Clark understands scaffolded cognition as an instance of the
extended mind (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). The idea of the
extended mind is based on the general hypothesis that cognitive
processes are not limited to what happens in the head but may
occur by allowing the external world to do some of the work.
Factors external to brain and body may be functionally integrated
in the overall cognitive system. On this account, cognition
consists of a specific kind of action that manipulates an external
tool or instrument, for example, using pencil and paper to do
math. Such extension occurs in cases in which the manipulation
of the external world can be considered functionally equivalent
to internal processes (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). What allows
something to be part of a cognitive system or “a proper part of
a genuinely cognitive process” (Clark, 2010, p. 85) is tied to its
function.3 According to the extended mind hypothesis, this is
expressed as the “parity principle” and is stated as follows.
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as
a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that
part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998, p. 8).
Doing math in one’s head counts as a cognitive process;
likewise, doing it with paper and pencil should count as
a cognitive process where paper and pencil function as a
mechanism or vehicle of cognition, functionally similar to
internal (e.g., neural) mechanisms. Just as in our heads we
3The details of the relationship between functionalism and the extended mind have
been a focus of a number of important papers – see Sprevak (2009), Miyazono
(2017), and Wadham (2016).
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may manipulate a mental model to solve the problem, we
manipulate paper and pencil to accomplish the same task (Clark,
1997b, p. 297).
If in some cases there is a functional similarity between
inner and outer processes, there are also many cases that
involve significant differences. This motivates an emphasis
on complementarity or functional integration, which includes
the idea that “different components of the overall (enduring
or temporary) system can play quite different roles and
have different properties while coupling in collective and
complementary contributions to flexible thinking and acting”
(Sutton, 2010, p. 194; see Menary, 2013). Functional integration
is indexed by differences in individual cognizers, and differences
in particular environments. Individual agents may have different
proclivities to use external props and instruments versus
internal processes like memorization, and this balance might be
modulated by changes or structures in the environment or what
one particular environment in contrast to another affords.
The argument for the extended mind thus turns primarily on
the way disparate inner and outer components may co-operate
so as to yield integrated larger systems capable of supporting
various (often quite advanced) forms of adaptive success (Clark,
1997b, p. 99).
The ideas of parity and complementarity signal, respectively,
different ways in which internal processes (beliefs, desires, mental
models and other representational states) play a role together
with the external vehicles or mechanisms that scaffold cognition.
The extended mind involves a hybrid of internal and external
processes where, in some cases, the cognitive processes are carried
primarily by external factors, and in others, by internal factors.
Building on the work of Denzau and North (1994) and Satz
and Ferejohn (1994), Clark recognizes that the larger system
supporting cognition can include institutions. “Institutions,
firms, and organizations seem to me to share many of the
key properties of pen, paper, and arithmetical practice in
this example” (Clark, 1997b, p. 279). At the same time, such
institutions impose structural limitations on individual choice.
“[W]hat is doing the work, in such cases, is not (so much)
the individual’s cogitations as the larger social and institutional
structures in which she is embedded” (Clark, 1997b, p. 272).
In terms of economics, Clark’s argument continues, market
mechanisms understood as institutional rules and practices,
promote actions that maximize returns relative to a fixed set
of goals. Thus, “firms and organizations provide an external
resource in which individuals behave in ways dictated by norms,
policies, and practices; norms, policies, and practices that may
even become internalized as mental models” (Clark, 1997b,
p. 279). In many cases, rather than basing economic choices solely
on a set of beliefs, desires, or other psychological states within
the individual, larger scale market structures that rule firm-level
strategies impose strong constraints on individual choice.
In the embrace of such powerful scaffolding, the particular
theories and worldviews of individuals may at times make
little impact on overall firm-level behavior. Where the external
scaffolding of policies, infrastructure, and customs is strong and
(importantly) is a result of competitive selection, the individual
members are, in effect, interchangeable cogs in a larger machine.
The larger machine extends way outside the individual and
incorporates large-scale social, physical and even geopolitical
structures (Clark, 1997b, p. 272).
Individuals may play interchangeable functional roles [at
the extreme as zero-intelligence traders (Gode and Shyam,
1993)] in the larger institutional processes. Such processes
may be underdetermined and open to varying dynamics of
positive feedback (the result of, for example, small early
perturbations in the overall economic system) (Arthur, 1990),
but these effects may still involve external factors rather
than individual psychological determinants. Accordingly, “the
explanatory burden is borne by overall system dynamics in
which the microdynamics of individual psychology is relatively
unimportant” (Clark, 1997b, p. 276). This, according to Clark,
but also according to the thought of well-known neoclassical
economists (e.g., Becker, 1962), would ultimately explain why
neoclassical economic theory works:
In cases where the overall structuring environment acts so as to
select in favor of actions which are restricted so as to conform to
a specific model of preferences, neoclassical theory works. And
it works because individual psychology no longer matters: the
“preferences” are imposed by the wider situation and need not be
echoed in individual psychology (Clark, 1997a, p. 183)
This does not mean that there is no role for individual
psychology in the economic system. Clark brings us back to
the notion of the extended mind where individual cognizers are
coupled to various external factors and institutional practices.
Specifically, there is interplay between individual internal mental
processes and a set of larger mechanisms that accounts for
innovation, the possibility of learning and expanding intellectual
horizons. Clark suggests that these may depend on individual
idiosyncrasies and positive feedback effects (Clark, 1997a, pp.
186–192). We think there is more to say on this issue. At
any point beyond zero-intelligence, the larger mechanisms can
support and motivate different practices leading to unpredictable
innovation outcomes. One type of behavior allowed but not
strictly dictated by the market mechanism is, for instance,
strategic behavior.
It would be useful for purposes of explicating Clark’s views
further, to see how both sides of the markets, suppliers and
consumers, can use the market mechanisms in seemingly
‘unorthodox’ ways. In general, consistent with Clark’s framework,
price can be re-conceptualized as an offloading device, i.e., a
cognitive artifact (see Risko and Gilbert, 2016), able to reduce
cognitive demands. Consistent with Clark (2005)’s emphasis
on the external vehicles of cognition, prices can be considered
external artifacts able to compensate for the lack of information
about allocation possibilities, which can be considered part
of economic agents’ bounded rationality (e.g., Simon, 1982;
see also Arnau et al., 2014).4 Clark, however, suggests that
the market mechanism differentially affects market participants.
4As Clark suggests: “Simon saw, very clearly, that portions of the external world
often functioned as a non-biological kind of memory. He thus saw the deep parity
(parity, not identity) that can obtain between external and internal resources”
(Clark, 2001, p. 139).
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On the supply side, he emphasizes that “[s]trong constraints
imposed by the larger scale market structure result in firm-
level strategies and policies that maximize profits” (Clark,
1997a, p. 272, emphasis added). In other words, suppliers
would be highly scaffolded, to the point of being induced to
maximize profits (or, more generally, utility), as dictated by
neoclassical economics.
Even if evidence on bounded rationality largely shows that
firms do not systematically maximize profits (Simon, 1979), we
suggest there is an even more important point to consider,
namely, that imposing constraints is not the only direction in
which a market scaffolds suppliers. For example, suppliers can
use the price mechanism strategically. Such strategic use of the
market can be visible, for instance, in the implementation of
price strategy – to defend market positions or conquer new
segments, for example – as prices can be considered signaling
and explorative tools (Spiegler, 2011; Tremblay et al., 2018). This
does not imply that strategy is the only way in which the market
enables suppliers. A variety of suppliers’ behaviors are enabled
by the market mechanism that are not necessarily compatible
with the immediate purpose of maximizing profits. This is to
say that scaffolding works in two directions and not only in the
constraining way (see also Cardinale, 2018). There are degrees
of freedom in the scaffolding mechanism, and the very same
market mechanism can enable novelty. In this view the same
notion of market efficiency, discussed above, is challenged by
the consideration that the economic environment continuously
invites new uses of existing economic resources, allowing the
emergence of innovations (Felin et al., 2016).
On the demand side, Clark claims that “the theory of
consumer behavior is weak [. . .] and the external scaffolding is
commensurably weaker” (Clark, 1997a, p. 183), thus implying
that consumers would be less bounded by the market
mechanisms than suppliers. In our understanding, however,
this postulated asymmetry between supply and demand can
be misleading. We know that consumers, by definition, go to
the market in order to solve their problems to procure their
means of subsistence compatibly with their budget constraints.
Even this simple neoclassical characterization of the consumer
problem would suffice to make clear that consumers are, in
principle, as equally scaffolded as suppliers by the market
mechanism. Even if we are less surprised that consumers often
behave more irrationally than suppliers do (but, not to forget,
also suppliers can be irrational, see Kahneman et al., 1991),
again this may not be the full story. The other part of the
story is the central and active role played by consumers in
the market mechanism, which goes beyond the simplistic view
that markets pragmatically provide goods and epistemically
provide information. Leibenstein (1950) emphasized that there
are various motives behind consumers’ actions in the market
(such as functional, speculative, social, and irrational motives).
We may add that there exists a further motive, in so far as by
acting in the market the consumer behaves so as to solve a real
epistemic problem. Not only does the consumer’s behavior (“to
buy” or “not to buy” at a certain price) contribute to determining
the market price; in addition the market process serves to extend
the consumer’s cognitive process in order to solve the consumer’s
problem, which involves reliably attaining a correct evaluation of
the good.5
We are led to the following ideas: markets (a) emerge from
the interaction of both sides (supply and demand), in their
continual and mutual interplay, and (b) involve more basic
social interactions that shape both sides. In both cases – supply
and demand – actions involved in price negotiations (in terms
of bid and ask prices) can be considered from an epistemic
point of view, not just pragmatically. Kirsh and Maglio (1994
p. 513) distinguish between pragmatic and epistemic actions:
pragmatic actions are “performed to bring one physically closer
to a goal” whereas epistemic actions are “performed to uncover
information that is hidden or hard to compute mentally.” In these
terms, price setting can be considered not just as a pragmatic
action that puts market parties a step closer to the exchange
moment, but as an action in which prices as artifacts are
manipulated for epistemic reasons, that is to say, to uncover, or
even create new knowledge. For example, on the supply side a
firm could change prices to evaluate how their competitors will
react to different price levels, and in general to try to discover
their strategic intent. On the demand side, a consumer could
negotiate the price not only to save money but to create a stable
and credible contact with the seller. To some extent, negotiating
could be a way to disclose intentions, and establish trust and
reciprocity between parties.
MARKET AS COGNITIVE INSTITUTION
In this and the next section, we build upon the notion of the
market as a “scaffolding institution” understood in terms of
the extended mind. We pursue an enactivist interpretation that
emphasizes social interaction. Thus, we propose to understand
a market as a socially extended cognitive institution and
to develop a picture of economic interactions among agents
framed in terms of relational autonomy, in an economic order
enacted by those very same economic agents. That markets
are cognitive institutions enabling and constraining economic
reasoning also leads to the possibility of specific types of
economic reasoning processes.
A market is not just a mechanism, a structure, or a narrowly-
conceived institution; it’s a social institution, and it emerges as
such because it involves intersubjective interactions embedded
in social and cultural practices. In an extended-mind model of
scaffolded choice, at least in some cases, rather than “beliefs,
desires, or other psychological features of individuals involved,”
what counts are the external structures that constrain and enable
economic agents’ behavior (Clark, 1997b, p. 272; see also Denzau
and North, 1994). Taking this one step further, on the model
of a socially extended mind (Gallagher, 2013) the constraints
imposed by social interactions, as well as the possibilities
enabled by such interactions, are such that economic reasoning is
never just an individual process carried out by an autonomous
individual, classically understood. Such considerations change
5For a different sort of epistemic problem solved by markets consider the case of
so-called “prediction market,” i.e., market used to reliably predict future events
(e.g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004).
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the theoretical notion of market from a mere economic
mechanism able to solve allocation and coordination problems
of collectivity (in specific circumstances, better than alternative
mechanisms) to an enactive cognitive institution. Considering
the perspective of the agents involved, the market as cognitive
institution is like Clark’s extended mind notion of scaffolded
cognition insofar as it (i) extends the participants’ cognitive
processes of economic reasoning, and (ii) both constrains and
enables the actions and interactions of embodied and embedded
agents in the economy. The enactive notion of cognitive
institution involves something more, however.
To see this, consider Slors’ (2019) recent clarification
of the difference between an extended-mind conception of
institution as a causal-functional unit, and the enactive model
of socially extended cognition, i.e., the idea of a mental
or cognitive institution. Slors defines cognitive institutions,
following Gallagher (2013, p. 6): “not only as institutions
with which we accomplish certain cognitive processes, but
also. . . without [which] such cognitive processes would no
longer exist.” Socially extended cognition is constituted in a
specific form of dynamical engagement with the world, one
that involves reciprocal causality.6 Simply put, an institution
is formed by cognitive (e.g., problem solving) practices that
involve multiple interacting agents pursuing multiple interrelated
tasks, and reciprocally, such interactions are shaped by instituted
(normative) practices that extend our cognitive processes when
we engage with them (that is, when we interact with, or are
enactively coupled to them in the right way).
This includes, as an example, the legal system, which “enables
an array of thoughts and actions that are unintelligible without
the concepts and procedural social routines associated with the
law” (Slors, 2019, p. 5). The practice of law is constituted by
just such cognitive and communicative processes carried out in
the cooperative activities of many agents relying on conventional
cognitive schemas and rules of evidence provided by the legal
institution itself. Reasoned judgments made in such contexts,
specified as legal judgments precisely because they are made in
such contexts, are forms of cognition that depend on the large
and complex system without which they could not happen. For
example, in the case of a highly trained attorney who may be
engaged in a process of legal reasoning, what makes this kind of
cognition what it is depends not only on the fact that she was
trained within a related institutional system (i.e., in the specific
practices of law school), but also on the continued workings of
the legal system. Indeed, some tasks would never even arise if it
were not for the legal system.
Slors contrasts the extended-mind conception of institution,
which, as we saw in the previous section, is based on the
idea of functional integration, with what he calls a “symbiotic”
6The notion of constitution at stake in this concept of socially extended cognition
is not simply, as Slors suggests, the notion of a synchronic compositional
constitution, as one finds in the new mechanist literature (e.g., Craver, 2007), but
also involves a diachronic dynamical constitution understood to involve reciprocal
causal relations. Acknowledging the concept of dynamical constitution is a way
to avoid one of the major objections to the extended mind idea – the idea
that extended and enactive models commit a causal/coupling-constitution fallacy
(Adams and Aizawa, 2008; Aizawa, 2010, Aizawa, 2014, and Gallagher, 2018b).
arrangement. He argues that in contrast to Clark’s concept
of institution (derived from Denzau and North, 1994) –
understood as an external mechanism that structures and orders
the individual’s environment so as to scaffold cognition – the
symbiotic cognition model is a better way to think about
socially extended cognitive institutions. A cognitive institution is
different, in principle, from the pencil and paper that I might use
to solve a math problem. Specifically, Slors defines the notion of
symbiotic cognition in terms of “task dependency.”
“Task dependency” is the extent to which the intelligibility of
a task depends on a larger whole of coordinated tasks. Task
dependency is a notion that is connected with coordination
and planning. It is a normative notion in the sense that high
task dependency means that tasks play specific roles in the
overall organization of a cognitive system or a cultural cognitive
ecosystem; roles that can be played properly or improperly
(Slors, 2019, p. 18).
For example, the legal system is characterized by high task
dependency since judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, clerk, and
other officials are inter-defined in a holistic way, such that what an
attorney does is understandable only by referring to what judges
and prosecutors do. As Slors suggests, this means that there is a
division of labor in a symbiotic system.
Division of labor involves a specific type of offloading, one which
is typical for symbiotic cognition but not for extended [mind].
Every participant in a symbiotic system profits from whatever the
system as a whole offers (education, justice, social coordination)
while contributing only a small part. The tasks, jobs and roles of
others in the system co-define and enable one’s own task, but one
does not have to perform them or even think about them, while
nevertheless benefiting from the overall outcome of the system
(Slors, 2019, p. 30).
In regard to the concept of market, we suggest that on
a symbiotic model one would have to think about market
dynamics in more complex terms than simply supply side
and demand side.7 On the symbiotic view, the market is a
“marketplace” (as Callon, 1998 specifically defines it) – that
is, a real set of human interrelationships embedded in a
workspace of different tasks – government regulator or planner,
corporation, manufacturing unit, information (or other service)
provider, marketer, wholesaler, retail agent, purchaser, consumer
(household), and any number of economic roles in between these
categories. Each task category may be defined not simply by
economic principles, but by non-economic norms and practices,
and by less formal and imperfect social interactions that may
involve a variety of biases. Different task-players are dynamically
related in a gestalt arrangement such that an intervention (above
a certain threshold) on one node or element in the system will
lead to modulations in other nodes or elements, or in the whole
(Gallagher, 2018b).
The concept of symbiotic arrangements clearly characterizes
some forms of cognitive institutions, but we note that, as Slors
acknowledges, the contrast between functional integration and
task dependency is a matter of degree. He suggests that the
7This is what economic sociologists typically do (e.g., Burt, 1992; Fligstein, 2001).
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legal system is characterized by high task dependency and
low functional integration, and he then (perhaps too quickly)
generalizes this to apply to all cognitive institutions in contrast
to extended mind models (high functional integration; low
task dependency), and models of distributed cognition (high
functional integration; high task dependency). We think the issue
is more complex and that the distinction between “low” and
“high” functional integration and task dependency is probably
too coarse-grained; rather, cognitive institutions vary in degree
between task dependency and functional integration depending
on where one is looking in the system, or from what perspective
one examines the system.8 For example, in the legal system, from
a systems perspective one sees high task dependency, whereas
from the perspective of the individual agent who engages with the
system, one finds a significant degree of functional integration.
An attorney, for example, has to make the system work by doing
certain things that require material engagement with papers,
law books, courtrooms, and many other people. What she does
may be defined in terms of specific tasks, but those tasks are
accomplished only by engaging with instruments and people, and
often in flexible and creative ways. Contracts and written (official)
documents are instrumentally functional and, at the same time,
they are “pieces” of the legal structure that in some cases predefine
or scaffold the roles of individuals. That is, at the same time, they
are, from the individual’s perspective, functionally instrumental
for extending legal reasoning and, from the systems perspective,
constitutive parts of the legal structure.9
We propose that more generally a cognitive institution always
involves varying degrees of task dependency and functional
integration. A market system is a good example of a cognitive
institution in this regard. A market is symbiotic, not in Slors’
sense, where the level of functional integration is low, but in
the sense that there is always a co-dependency between the
actions and social interactions of individual agents and the
market institution. Buying or not buying a good in the market
is, from an interactive point of view, something that enacts the
market. In this respect, the level of functional integration is
high. Engaging in “epistemic actions” (biding or selling items
on the market) enacts the market such that the market would
not be there without these actions. At the same time, the
8We take the distinction between task-dependency and functional integration to
reflect different kinds of coupling. Task-dependency involves structural coupling
(an agent engages with the system by performing a certain type of task or
occupying a certain place in the system); functional integration is causal (or
dynamical, reciprocally causal) coupling. One can characterize different cognitive
systems (or institutions) as involving different combinations of these kinds of
coupling.
9Slors further points out that in a symbiotic system the interaction that constitutes
a cognitive institution “is facilitated by a physical infrastructure and specific
physical artifacts.” Although this is clearly an aspect that fits with conceptions
of extended minds and markets, we note that material engagement theory
(Malafouris, 2013) leads to a stronger claim based on enactivist principles:
markets are constituted by material engagements which in turn, and over time,
shape the rationality and agency of market participants and create meanings
that go beyond economic significance. This involves not only engagement with
commodities – goods or services that depend on production or exchange facilities,
infrastructure, transport and communication equipment, as well as advanced
technology processes – but also a range of embodied or virtual intersubjective
interactions that characterize any institution. There is much more to say on this
point, but to pursue it would lead beyond the scope of this paper.
market, as a cognitive institution is not only an institution that
supports or scaffolds specific acts of economic reasoning; it is also
such that without it “such cognitive processes would no longer
exist” (Gallagher, 2013, p. 3). From this perspective, markets
and price mechanisms are more than extended processes that
scaffold economic reasoning about the scarcity of goods. They
are institutions for enacting economic, task-dependent relations,
as social interactions, which themselves become the object (or
subject-matter) of economic reasoning, which would not exist –
as we know it – without markets.
Specifically, we contend, there are reciprocal relations,
symbiotic interactions involved in the cognitive institution,
characterized by degrees of both functional integration and
task dependency. The judge not only extends his cognitive
processes by engaging with the legal system through, or
facilitated by, a set of intersubjective interactions; in addition,
it’s precisely by the judge’s engagement (and many other
such engagements) that the legal system is enacted. Just
so, the individual economic agent extends his reasoning by
engaging with the market through, or facilitated by,10 a set
of intersubjective interactions, thereby epistemically benefiting
from the market process; and reciprocally it is precisely by
that engagement (and many other such engagements) that the
market is enacted.
The efficiencies and inefficiencies, as well as degrees of
trust and mistrust (to make room for what Clark (1997a,
p. 276) calls “individual psychological profiles,” without putting
them entirely back in the head) present in the market are
anchored in the specific types of social interactions that a
market makes possible. It’s true, as Denzau and North (1994)
point out, that gains from trade and productive coordination
in a market economy are based on the existence of some
degree of trust: “The morality of a business person is a
crucial intangible asset of a market economy, and its non-
existence substantially raises transaction costs” (Denzau and
North, 1994, p. 20). Trust, however, to whatever degree, is not
the product of shared mental models, as they suggest; it’s a
product of and varies with different types of intersubjective
interactions; it gets cashed out in the meaning that emerges from
and transcends any individual’s actions or thoughts as it gets
instituted (De Jaegher et al., 2010).
The trust that is characteristic, for instance, of impersonal
(typically electronic) forms of financial markets is not
equivalent to forms of intersubjective trust that may characterize
hierarchical or clan societies. In impersonal (e.g., anonymous)
markets, economic reasoning, and appropriate degrees of
trust, are enabled by the fact that individual decisions may
sometimes be “cold” and calculative since an interaction with
other economic agents may be “living” only in the immediate
transaction, through which a mutual benefit is reached and after
which all obligations are extinguished. Price mechanisms allow
an efficient allocation so that before and after the transaction all
10That the engagement is “facilitated by” a set of intersubjective interactions is a
way of expressing the idea that even in cases of anonymous activity where there
is no occurrent intersubjective interactions (as, e.g., in regulated financial markets
or in computer-run algorithmic trading) the anonymous processes are ultimately
grounded in previous intersubjective interactions.
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information is exploited and balance is immediate. Of course, we
are not arguing that this is the case of any market (many real-
world markets require the building of long-term relationships,
see Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1991), but that some markets
are specifically appreciated for their frugality and impersonality.
In other forms of institution (such as hierarchies or clans) the
obligations between parties typically persist in the long-term.
Accordingly, the single transaction in itself is not necessarily
fair. In the case of a clan, the relational dynamics involved are
something like “I do something for you today, and you will
do something for me in the future;” in the case of hierarchies:
“you work hard now but in the future you will be promoted
to manager.” Balance is postponed. Economic reasoning varies
across these different institutions precisely because interactions




Adam Smith’s works The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith,
1759) and The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776) represent
two significant contributions to understanding the origins of
markets and their institutionalization. While in the first work
Smith emphasizes the importance of “sympathetic” interaction
for the development of morality, in the second he emphasizes
the importance of self-interest and the calculative attitude as
requisite features for a proper functioning of market economies.
The intrinsic unity of the two contributions has hardly
been acknowledged by neoclassical economics (see Bruni and
Zamagni, 2007, Chapter 5), so much so that it has usually been
easier to postulate the existence of two different Smiths (Smith,
1998). What results as problematic from the partial reading of
Smith’s opera is a notion of autonomy, understood in terms
of self-sufficiency, self-legislation, or self-determination, which
has colonized economics in general (Nelson, 2006), and the
economics of market in particular (Zak, 2008; Sandel, 2013),
through the notion of homo oeconomicus. This situation does not
particularly change if we add more modern readings of Smith’s
work, which for instance identify Smith as a father of behavioral
economics (Ashraf et al., 2005).
An alternative concept of relational autonomy is based on
the idea that autonomy is actualized in social interactions that
involve varying and imperfect degrees of mutual recognition
(Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Honneth, 2008; Gallagher, 2017).
On an enactivist view of social interaction there is always a
balanced and partial trade-off between the autonomy of the
individual embodied agent and the autonomy of the process
of social interaction itself (De Jaegher et al., 2010). Interaction
requires the preservation of some degree of individual autonomy,
but that makes one’s autonomy relative to other agents and
to the nature of specific interactions. Autonomous actions are
thus embodied and situated in a world that is physical and
social. This interpretation correlates with a more enactive view
of economic reasoning that understands the market participant
in terms of social interactive processes, and an autonomy that is
by degree and that exists for the individual agent only because
she is socially situated. Economic reasoning, understood in
terms of relational autonomy, is always (to varying degrees)
embodied,11 embedded in material engagements, and scaffolded
by intersubjective interactions. By contrast, the relational
dimension is so much absent in neoclassical economics that,
in economic modeling, it is often sufficient to assume the
existence of a “representative agent” to stand in for the collectivity
(Kirman, 1992).
But markets can be a double-edged sword. A market operating
as a cognitive institution – enabling and constraining economic
reasoning – can easily reflect an ideology. Market ideology
is probably a byproduct of markets as cognitive institutions.
There are reasons to think that markets – and in particular
electronic financial markets, which can be viewed as market
forms engineered to facilitate impersonal coordination – in
some cases undermine recognition and relational autonomy, by
imposing a form of “avatar recognition,” a reification in which
one’s self and others are reduced to merely rational/calculative
agents. Reification “means a forgetting of the primal recognition
that two humans accord each other in a fundamental process of
intersubjective interactions” (Jay, 2008, p. 8; see Honneth, 2008).
In other words, reification is the opposite of autonomy.
Reification and the denial of autonomy, are real phenomena at
the political level of nations and subnational groups, but they can
be just as real in our everyday lives, in our relations with others,
as well as in the externally imposed bureaucratic, administrative,
and institutional pathologies that Honneth points to as involving
“cold” and “calculating compliance” (Honneth, 2008, p. 17).
Reified and pre-packaged ways of interacting lack dynamic
spontaneity, impose a mechanistic order, and can undermine the
autonomous processes implicit in genuine forms of interaction.
It is important to note, in this regard, how reification can
be even counterproductive with respect to economic principles
themselves. Bowles (2016) makes a compelling case that market
design and incentive-based policies are not the “substitute of
good citizens.” As Adam Smith acknowledged, non-strictly-
economic values are needed to make a market really function
(see also Zak, 2008). When the neoclassical notion of economic
rationality is detached from more basic social interactions, it
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy (see Denzau and North, 1994;
Ferraro et al., 2005), in so far as markets can be engineered
in view of programmatically fostering and selecting that sort of
rationality. In other words, markets can be said to be “performed”
by economic theory, which would shape markets in its own image
by imprinting in them its own notion of rationality (Callon,
1998; MacKenzie, 2006).12 Markets are ways in which we can
reasonably understand and predict others’ behaviors within our
human interactions; at the same time, the fact that we can do this
11For economic reasoning as a form of embodied rationality see Mastrogiorgio
and Petracca (2016); also Gallagher (2018a); for traditional forms of rationality in
economics see, e.g., Blume and Easley (2008).
12Similar criticism has been made about the large (and often reductionist) claims
about human nature sometimes made by neuroscience, and especially popular
media coverage of neuroscientific discoveries, namely that we all start to think of
ourselves in those reductionist terms. See, e.g., Choudhury and Slaby (2012) and
Slaby (2010).
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means that often the relational potential is sometimes reified to
calculative purposefulness.
Honneth (2008, p. 24) describes a change of perspective from
empathic/sympathetic engagement to detached observation.
The latter tends toward a reification of others and can
be found in attitudes that commodify relationships and
interaction (e.g., Summerville and Chartier, 2013). Reification
and commodification can even become, as it has been observed
in particular by Marxist theorists with special reference to the
large mechanisms of capitalism, a social practice strategically
relevant to social struggle (Postone, 1993). Honneth (2008, p. 28)
however, suggests that the detached, observational relation may
in fact be a necessary strategic stance required in developed
societies to deal with some aspects of the business of everyday
life. This kind of detached stance may have a “perfectly
legitimate place” in some situations. How legitimate market
detachment is also crucially depends on the object of the
transaction [think of markets for organs from living donors (e.g.,
Rippon, 2014), which could be viewed as a patent example of
reification (see Satz, 2010)]. Still, we can ask to what extent
a market structure, intended as the set of market features
that enable/constrain market participants, contributes to such
detached attitudes and reductions in relational autonomy. That
is, in studying the way that markets work, we can recognize
the variability of market institutions in terms of how they affect
intersubjective recognition and autonomy, thereby giving us a
way to ask critical questions about how they might be adjusted
or transformed with a view to reducing reification, increasing
autonomy, and addressing institutionally generated distortions in
intersubjective interactions.
CONCLUSION
An important part of what it means for agents to be situated in
the everyday world of human affairs includes their engagement
with economic practices. Traditional economic theory views the
market as a set of mechanisms for exchange and allocation or
coordination. Such conceptions focus more on the structure of
markets and how information is processed by market structure
in ways that may facilitate the deployment of a set of mental
models and behaviors by the individual participant. This leads
to the specific idea of market institution as external mechanism
that orders or structures rational decisions and human relations.
These ideas are taken up by Clark and framed in terms of the
extended mind hypothesis. In this case, the market is understood
as scaffolding economic reasoning via strong constraints that
direct agents’ behaviors in predictable ways. Markets produce
a “cognitive economy” by reducing individual cognitive effort
thereby steering individuals’ decisions and actions.
We’ve argued that a market understood as an institution
is not just a mechanism, or an external structure narrowly
conceived; rather, it’s a social institution that emerges as such
from intersubjective interactions in social and cultural practices.
On this view, it not only extends the participant’s economic
reasoning processes, constraining and enabling the actions and
interactions of embodied and situated agents in the economy, but
as a cognitive institution it is enacted in just these processes and
is characterized by varying degrees of both task dependency and
functional integration.
An enactive perspective on the market as a socially extended
cognitive institution offers a picture of the economic interactions
of individuals framed in terms of relational autonomy, in an
economic order enacted by those very same economic agents.
That markets are cognitive institutions enabling and constraining
economic reasoning also leads to the possibility of specific
types of economic reasoning processes, characterized in some
cases by calculative purposefulness. Speculatively, this latter form
of economic reasoning can be considered a “materialization”
of Weber’s ideal-type of “Zweckrationalität” or instrumental
rationality. In the extreme it can lead to distorted social
interactions. This is clearly recognized by critical theorists when
they inquire about how institutions shape both our cognitive
processes and our interpersonal interactions (Honneth, 2012;
Gallagher, in press). An understanding of real-world markets
as socially extended cognitive institutions helps us to see that
designing and performing markets in ways that might counter
distorting modes of rationality are not simply about changing
external structures, but can have an effect on the individual
(relational) autonomy involved in everyday situated practices.
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